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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
E L R O Y W U L F E N S T E I N , 
H O W A R D H. C A R T E R and 
J O H N W H I T N E Y , 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
Case No. 
vs. f 13617 
E L L I S LARSON and 
ORA H . LARSON, his wife, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
N A T U R E OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a Judgment and Decree of 
Specific Performance entered in the above entitled case 
in favor of the plaintiffs. I t was found that the defend-
ants did sign an option for the sale of realty, and the 
plaintiffs exercised the option properly and were en-
titled to have the same performed. 
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D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R COURT 
The case was tried before the Honorable J . Harlan 
Burns, District Judge, on the 29th day of October, 
1973. H e awarded judgment and a decree of specific 
performance in favor of plaintiffs. H e ordered per-
formance of the option for purchase of realty, with a 
finding that the option had been exercised in accordance 
with the terms thereof. 
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L 
Defendants seek to have this Court set aside the 
decree of specific performance and by this response, Re-
spondent seeks that the decree of the lower court be 
affirmed. 
S T A T E M E N T O F FACTS 
We must supplement the Statement in Appellant's 
brief so the Court will have a more complete under-
standing of the facts in evidence which relate to the 
issues. 
The option is for 1040 acres of ranch land for 
$100,000.00. Five Hundred Dollars (Exh P-2) was 
paid down when the option was signed and retained by 
defendants. The first payment of $10,000.00 was tend-
ered into escrow as scheduled. The facts surrounding 
the exercise of the option are the basic issues before the 
Court in this appeal. The Option (Exh P-l ) is dated 
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March 8, 1971, and required exercise "at any time be-
fore March 8, 1972 at 5 o'clock P.M." This was exer-
cised by deposit of $10,000.00 in escrow, as required, on 
March 4 at Southern Utah Title Company, and send-
ing a written notice to defendants by certified mail. 
The letter of exercise of the Option (Exh P-3) is 
dated March 4, 1972, and attached thereto is the Re-
ceipt for certified mail, showing its deposit in the St. 
George Post Office, certified mail, properly addressed 
to the defendants, on March 6, 1972, two days before 
the end of the Option. March 6, 1972 was a Monday. 
Exh P-4 is a copy of the Post Office form, Notice 
of Attempted Delivery left at the defendants' home on 
March 7, 1972, and receipt of the envelope March 13, 
1972. The testimony of the Postmaster was that the 
certified mail communication was duly received on Mon-
day, March 6, and the delivery was attempted on March 
7. As the defendants were not at home, the notice (Exh 
P-4) was left at their home. The defendants did not 
come to the Post Office to pick up the envelope until 
March 13. Obviously the defendants had received the 
notice, as it was taken to the post office on the 13th, and 
defendant Ellis Larson signed for the envelope at that 
time. Receipt of the Notice of Attempted Delivery on 
March 7 was not denied by defendants. They were not 
at home when the postman came by, and elected not to 
go to the post office until the next week and pick up 
the letter of exercise of the option. Defendants did not 
go to Southern Utah Title Company and pick up the 
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check for $10,000.00 out of the escrow, nor submit the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract as required, but advised 
plaintiffs that it was too late. 
On the issue of the execution of the Option and the 
alleged changes, appellants' statement of facts fails to 
make mention of the undenied fact that the appellants 
had a copy of the Option for nearly a year before the 
exercise of the option, and had made no complaint about 
its contents. In fact, Exh D-l is the copy of such Option 
which the Larsons had received by mail after it was no-
tarized, and which they held from March, 1971, and it is 
complete. Apparently hoping to get more money, Ellis 
Larson had gone to Mr. Wulf enstein's home in Decem-
ber, 1971 to talk about a change in the payment sched-
ule, a thing which he would not have done if he had not 
known of the contents of the Option at that time. No 
claim was made of an unauthorized filling in when they 
met in December, 1971. 
The only change in the document was the one made 
at the time of signing, when the number of acres was 
reduced by writing over the typed figures of 1140 acres, 
the figures 1040, in ink, and Mr. Wulfenstein then 
wrote beside it his first name, "Elroy," to reflect that 
he acceded to the reduction of the acreage. There was 
no reason for the Larsons to initial this, as it was a re-
duction of the acreage being subjected to the Option. 
The option is a printed form which requires, "This 
option shall be exercised by notification in writing to 
the Party of the First Part." No alteration of this part 
4 
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of the form was made by either party. Appellants did 
not alter this to require hand delivery or any specific 
method of transmission of the writing. 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
O P T I O N W A S E X E R C I S E D W I T H I N T H E 
T I M E A N D IN T H E M A N N E R A L L O W E D 
B Y L A W . 
The printed Option form used by the parties is 
silent as to the method of transmittal of the "notification 
in writing." I t establishes Southern Utah Title Com-
pany as the "Escrow Agent" and directs the procedure 
for disbursement of the funds that were deposited at the 
time of the exercise of the option. The $10,000.00 was 
deposited on or prior to March 4, 1972, the same date 
as the letter of notification of exercise of the option— 
four days prior to the expiration date. 
I t is to be observed that in the Memorandum Deci-
sion issued by Judge J . Harlan Burns (R 91-96) he 
emphasizes that the copy of the Option (after notariza-
tion by Mr. Howard Carter of Southern Utah Title 
Company) was mailed to the Larsons. Mr. Larson says 
that he received such by mail and put it away. Thus a 
course of communication was established and accepted 
by the parties at the inception. I t therefore was not un-
usual, when the $10,000.00 was deposited with the 
escrow agent, for the written notification of exercise of 
the option to be given by U.S. mail. 
5 
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Because of the deadline set forth in the Option of 
5:00 P.M. March 8,1972, this was sent by certified mail 
on March 6, and delivery was attempted on March 7, 
with written notification being left at the Larsons' home 
on March 7. Defendants have not explained why they 
did not pick up the envelope the next day. They have 
emphasized the nearness to the post office and the office 
of Southern Utah Title Company. The only assumption 
that can be made is that defendants imagined that by 
perversely delaying the pick-up of the letter until after 
the 8th, the option would lapse. 
As the trial court has said in his Memorandum, 
The pivitol issue raised by the facts found and 
above recited by the court, is one of whether or 
not the mailing of the notice 48 hours prior and 
the attempted delivery by postal authorities one 
24 hour period prior to the date in time the option 
expired, was sufficient notice of acceptance to 
mature the option contract under the law of this 
state. 
I t is to be observed that the plaintiff had made a timely 
deposit of the $10,000.00 in escrow as required by the 
option, and had mailed the notice of exercise of the op-
tion in a timely manner. Any delay in receipt thereof 
was solely the result of the acts of the defendants in 
attempting to defeat the option itself. Their motivation 
is obvious in their resistance to the completion of the 
transaction and their refusals which have made neces-
sary this present litigation. 
The mailing of the exercise of the option, coupled 
6 
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with the affirmative step of depositing the $10,000.00 in 
escrow in a timely manner, was an effective act con-
stituting acceptance of the offer of sale, which would 
be a legal characterization of an option. The prior con-
duct of the parties in transmitting the original option to 
the defendants by U.S. mail, without any objection or 
protest by the defendants, indicates the fact that no 
other method of communication was intended, desig-
nated or required by the option. The defendants em-
phasized the fact that St. George is not a large com-
munity and that the residence of the defendants was not 
far removed from either the office of the Southern Utah 
Title Company or the U.S. Post Office, or for that 
matter very far from the residence of the plaintiff. Not-
withstanding this, an orderly and responsible proceed-
ing for giving "written notification," as required by the 
option, is by certified mail deposited with the U.S. post-
al authorities. 
The testimony of the postmaster established the 
diligent manner in which they received the written noti-
fication, as evidenced by the stamp on the receipt given 
at the time that the fee for the certified mail was paid, 
the notification given on the following date of the at-
tempted delivery and advising the defendants to come 
to the post office and pick up the certified mail com-
munication, and the safe keeping of the same until the 
defendants did come to the post office and sign for the 
document. The only excuse (and we believe a rather 
lame excuse) that was given by the defendant, Ellis 
Larson, for not picking up the notification earlier, was 
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that he was "too busy." If he was really that busy, it 
would have been fruitless for the plaintiffs to attempt 
hand-delivery to him at his residence, and they used the 
only practical and realistic method available, namely the 
U.S. postal service. 
There is some split in authority as to whether or 
not the deposit of the notification in the mail is the criti-
cal factor, or whether the actual receipt of the notifica-
tion is essential, before the option has been exercised. 
W e know of nothing in the state of Utah that would 
negative the use of U.S. mails for the giving of a "writ-
ten notification." W e would assume that it has been the 
experience of all that most written communications are 
made by the use of the mails, rather than by hand de-
livery or through the engagement of an independent 
courrier. 
In Morello v. Growers Grape Products Associa-
tion, 186 P . 2d 463, it is held that the contract is com-
plete when a letter of acceptance is posted, absent any 
provision in the offer requiring the letter of acceptance 
to be received. This appears to be a rule recognizing the 
realities of life that such is a common and generally ac-
cepted procedure. In our present case the parties them-
selves had more or less established this method of com-
munication, as the written option was taken to the office 
of Mr. Howard Carter for notarization; he called the 
defendants on the telephone to verify their signing of 
the same, and then performed the notarization (a 
method which the trial court felt to be less than desir-
8 
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able) and then mailed the copy to the defendant. The 
defendant Ellis Larson put it away and made no ob-
jection to that method of transmittal of the option itself. 
Had the defendants desired that there should be 
placed in their hands and received by them the letter of 
notification, they could have inserted such into the con-
tract prior to signing, but such was not deemed essential, 
apparently, by them, or of any critical nature, or per-
haps it was not even considered by them at the time of 
the signing of the option. I t is to be observed that this 
was a printed form and the delict of specifying the 
method of transmittal is not to be blameworthy toward 
either party who has signed the document. The testi-
mony in the record shows that the blanks were filled out 
by Mr. Howard Carter of Southern Utah Title Com-
pany, at the instance and request of the plaintiff, so as 
to the typewritten portion if there were ambiguities or 
uncertainties such might be attributable to the plaintiff. 
But no such contention is made and no such ambiguities 
exist in the typewritten portion of the document. 
In 17 Am. Jur. 2nd Supp. page 27, we have two 
citations which affirm on a rather current basis the trend 
of the courts toward the position that the mailing of the 
exercise of the option or the acceptance of the offer in 
regular manner with the postal authorities, constitutes 
the acceptance itself. 
Where a letter confirming exercise of option 
to purchase was mailed within the period of op-
tion, it constituted the valid acceptance of the 
offer under the terms of the option, even though 
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the letter was received after the period had ex-
pired. Re Crossman's Estate, 231 Cal. App. 2d. 
270, 41 Cal. Rptr. 800. 
The well-established rule is that in the absence 
of any limitation or provision to the contrary in 
the offer, acceptance of an offer is complete and 
the contract becomes binding upon those parties 
when the offeree deposits acceptance in the post 
box. Reserve Insurance Company v. D<weketty 
249 Maryland, 108, 238 A. 2d. 536. 
What really is happening is that the defendants are 
trying to impose into the contract new terms and condi-
tions by their own construction of the contract and by 
their own testimony, namely that there had to be a writ-
ten notification of the exercise of the option delivered 
to them prior to the expiration date. In a recent decision 
by your court, E. A. Strout Western Realty Agency, 
Inc. v. Broderick, April 30, 1974, the court construed a 
listing agreement between a vendor and a realtor. 
Though the issues are not the same, the holding is sig-
nificant and in line with the prior decisions of this court, 
namely that by defendants' self-serving oral declara-
tions and self-serving construction, the written contract 
between the parties may not be altered or changed. 
. . . However,, under the general rule, which is 
applicable here, parol evidence may not be given 
to change the terms of a written agreement 
which are clear, definite and unambiguous. To 
permit that would be to cast doubt upon the in-
tegrity of all contracts and to leave a party to a 
solemn agreement at the mercy of the uncertain-
ties of oral testimony given by one who in the 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
subsequent light of events discovers he has made 
a bad bargain. 
Written words can be examined so as to ascer-
tain what they stand for in connection with par-
ticular conduct or particular objects. Thus ex-
pressions of the parties prior to and contempo-
raneous with the execution of the written instru-
ment may be helpful in understanding the mean-
ing of the language used. However, the defend-
ant here does not seek to explain the meaning as 
a paragraph. He simply wants the court to elimi-
nate it in its entirety. This the courts cannot do. 
Thus we believe that this court will agree with the 
decision of Judge Burns, namely that in light of the 
absence of any specifics in the printed option form as to 
how the written notification should be given, that the 
conduct of the parties theretofore in having the option 
delivered within St. George by U.S. mail is consistent 
with the conduct of the buyer in exercising the option 
and giving written notification, after the deposit of the 
$10,000.00 in the escrow created by the option, likewise 
by use of the U.S. postal facilities. The utilization of 
certified mail was a further step in attempting to assure 
that the purchaser had a record of when the document 
was deposited with the post office, two days prior to the 
expiration of the option date. 
Some point is made in the brief of the appellant 
under Point I I that the option was plaintiffs' document 
and was not interpreted against them by the trial court. 
This seems a very unusual assertion, in that the area that 
is in dispute, namely the method of transmittal of the 
11 
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written notification of the exercise of the option, is a 
part of a printed document, a form that has been used 
by many people in the community and in many other 
areas, and is not something unique to plaintiff, though 
plaintiff did supply the document for execution by th^ 
parties. The printed form was used and the dispute does 
not relate to the portions that are filled in, as such is not 
an element that would call for any construction or inter-
pretation against the plaintiffs. Had the typed-in por-
tions of the contract been ambiguous, conflicting or un-
certain, then perhaps parol evidence could have been 
adduced by the parties to clarify the same, and had a 
difficult ambiguity still remained, then the court would 
have a duty to construe the same against the drafter 
thereof. No attempt was made in the course of the trial 
to impose this upon the court, and the court wisely ascer-
tained that this was not the type ambiguity that called 
for an adverse construction contrary to the evidence and 
the postal records. 
P O I N T I I 
O P T I O N W A S NOT VOID AND NO A L T E R A -
TIONS W E R E M A D E CONTRARY TO IN-
STRUCTIONS. 
This whole segment of the case appears to be predi-
cated upon the hypothesis that the document was not 
completed at the time of signing, and that thereafter it 
was filled in contrary to instructions other than the au-
thorization given by the defendants. I t is to be observed 
12 
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that the references made in the brief dwell on the visit 
made by Mr. Larson to Mr. Wulfenstein around 
Christmas, some nine months after the time of the sign-
ing of the option and the delivery of the copy of the op-
tion to the Larsons. Apparently it was getting toward 
the end of the year and Mr. Larson was reviewing his 
tax problems, had re-evaluated whether he wanted to 
sell the property or not, and had gone to Mr. Wulfen-
stein to negotiate different terms. No different terms 
were ever agreed upon and the option was never altered, 
and the option as signed is the one that was introduced 
into evidence. 
The fact that Mr. Larson had the option from 
March, 1971 until the time of the initiating of this law 
suit after the exercise of the option, without making any 
complaint as to the purported improper f illing-in of the 
blanks, seems very significant to us, and we believe was 
of importance in the mind of the trial Judge in making 
his decision. The trial Judge had the opportunity of see-
ing Mr. Larson, observing his demeanor and hearing his 
testimony and drawing conclusions from such, a pro-
vince which this court does not have. Even with the dry 
record of the transcript, it shows clearly that it was not 
until Christmas that Mr. Larson discussed with Mr. 
Wulfenstein a possible different method of payment for 
the property, rather than the $10,000.00 at the time of 
the exercise of the option. 
There are contradictions in the testimony of Mr. 
Larson at page 77 of the record, wherein he states that 
13 
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he went to Mr. Wulfenstein's home about Christmas 
time, and that he discussed a different method of pay-
ment and was first assured that he could have his money 
any way he wanted it, but when defendants' counsel 
asked him whether or not Mr. Wulf enstein had said that 
he could have the 29% down, Mr. Larson then said that 
Mr. Wulfenstein said no, that he didn't say that. H e 
then stated that he made no effort after the signing of 
the option in March until that Christmas to discuss any 
alteration in the terms of the option. 
The items which they contend were filled in con-
trary to instructions are 
(a) The utilization of Southern Utah Title Com-
pany as the escrow agent, though no other escrow 
agent was ever named, designated or even repre-
sented to be desired by the defendants; and 
(b) As to the $10,000.00 down and the annual 
$10,000.00 payments plus interest. 
The testimony of Mr. Howard H . Carter and the testi-
mony of Mr. Wulfenstein were that the blanks had been 
filled in completely prior to the time of the presentation 
of the document to the Larsons for signature in March 
of 1971. Mr. Carter is the manager of Southern Utah 
Title Company and he is the one who typed up the op-
tion on the printed form prior to its submission to the 
Larsons, and also he is the one who notarized the docu-
ment and talked with the Larsons by telephone immedi-
ately following the signing of the same. Also he is the 
14 
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one that transmitted by mail the copy of the document 
to the Larsons. Perhaps we should review the conten-
tion that the document is void because the blanks were 
filled in, in light of the Utah law relating to the same. 
(It is not conceded that the blanks were in existence at 
the time of signing, but assuming such for the purpose 
of this argument only.) This court has decided that if a 
document is signed in blank and the blanks are filled in 
in pursuance of the instructions, that no prejudice re-
sults to any party and that such does not make the docu-
ment void. This general principle is reaffirmed in the 
E. A. Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. Brod-
erick (supra). There it was stated that parol evidence 
may be received to clarify ambiguous language in a con-
tract, to show what the agreement was relative to filling 
in blanks and to supply omitted terms which were 
agreed upon but inadvertently left out of the written 
agreement. The case of Fox Film Corp. v. Ogden 
Theater Co., Inc., 83 Utah 279,17 P. 2d 294 is cited. In 
our present case the defendants merely contend that 
these were blank, and do not attempt to explain that 
they should have been filled out with different terms. I t 
was not until nine months later, namely Christmas of 
1971, that Mr. Larson stated that he wanted 29% down. 
Apparently they would have the court believe that the 
method of payment for the property was never dis-
cussed except in generalities, and that they signed the 
contract giving the option of purchase without any spe-
cification as to the method of payment. The document 
in its printed form clearly calls for an escrow agent and 
15 
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for the payment of the money to the escrow agent and 
disbursement by that escrow agent, and yet the defend-
ants have not suggested any other company to act as the 
escrow agent, or that there was any agreement that 
some other company should act as an escrow agent. 
Certainly in the interest of a completed contract the 
logic is absolutely on the side of the plaintiffs that the 
identity of the escrow agent be named and that the 
method of making the payments upon exercise of the 
option be named. In the Strout Western Realty Agency 
v. Broderick case, supra, the court found that even 
though some items on the back of the agreement were 
blank, that such was not fatal to the basic concept in that 
case that if there was a sale of the property a commission 
was to be paid to the realtor. Likewise, in our present 
case the court in the trial of the matter found that there 
was a completed document, that the blanks had been 
filled in prior to the signing, and that this was the agree-
ment of the parties. As has been said many times before, 
the advantageous position of the trial judge will be 
honored by this court when the trial judge has seen the 
demeanor of the witnesses, heard their testimony and 
been able to reach the findings, conclusions and decree 
based upon such. The judgment of the trial court in 
matters of this nature will not be overturned by this 
court unless there is a clear error and unless there are 
matters in evidence that undeniably require a different 
conclusion by the trial judge. Such is not the circum-
stance in this case. 
16 
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The document was completed, according to the 
testimony of two of the witnesses, prior to the time of 
signing. The variances in the darkness of the type in 
parts of the document, which defendant asserts is proof 
that the matter was typed in at a later date, were fully 
explained by Mr. Carter, in that he frequently takes 
documents out of his typewriter as he goes along and as 
information comes to him, and replaces them with 
others, and then puts the original one back in to com-
plete his typing, and that nevertheless he was certain 
that all of the blanks were completed prior to the time 
that it was given to Mr. Wulfenstein to take out for the 
signature by the Larsons in March of 1971. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of the present case is to require the 
defendants, Larsons, to complete their agreement to sell 
the ranch for $100,000.00. Specific performance was 
decreed by the Court and plaintiffs stand ready and 
willing to perform. The $500.00 for the option has been 
retained by the defendants and the $10,000.00 is still in 
the hands of the designated escrow agent. 
We urge that the decision of the trial Court be af-
firmed. The defendants will have the benefit of their 
bargain, namely $100,000.00, and the plaintiffs will be 
allowed to acquire title. The trial Court has carefully 
weighed the evidence and issued his Memorandum De-
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cision, and then caused the Findings, Conclusions and 
Judgment to be made and entered. Such is in harmony 
with the relevant laws, decisions and rules of equity. 
Respectfully submitted, 
P U G S L E Y , H A Y E S , WASKISS, 
C A M P B E L L & C O W L E Y 
By Harry D. Pugsley 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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